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REGULATORY INTERVENT IONS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
THE F INANCING OF CHINA’S “ STATE CAPITAL ISM”
Nicholas Calcina Howson
Introduction
Many observers assume that the “state capitalism” model of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) implicates relatively unfettered control of listed subsidiary corporations 
by the agents of the PRC Party-state, whether direct state equity owners, state-affiliated 
holding companies (or groups), or the nomenklatura-origin individuals appointed 
or elected to the Chinese Communist Party committee, board, supervisory board, 
or senior management of such firms. This assumption may not be entirely accurate. 
Instead, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and other bureaucratic 
agencies have for many years imposed mandatory governance constraints on a formally 
shareholder-oriented and “enabling” law-based corporate governance system, with the 
express goal of empowering minority shareholders and constraining the power and 
discretion of the PRC’s strongest political-economic actors under the state capitalism 
model.1
 1 See Nicholas Calcina Howson, “Quack Corporate Governance” as Traditional Chinese Medicine—The 
Securities Regulation Cannibalization of China’s Corporate Law and a State Regulator’s Battle against Party 
State Political Economic Power, 37 Seattle U. L. Rev. 667 (2014).
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This chapter reviews the structural reasons for this sustained intervention, and specu-
lates as to how and why one tentacle of the Party-state—the CSRC—has been permitted 
to implement this constraining mechanism on other, far more powerful tentacles of the 
same political-economic structure: corporatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs). I con-
clude with thoughts on how these constraints and enhanced accountability mechanisms 
contribute in a significant way to the financing, and thus the continuing viability, of 
China’s state capitalism.
I. A “Mandatory” Regulatory Intervention into the Province 
of “Enabling” Law
China’s public company regulators have over the past two decades consistently acted to 
create, re-craft, or anticipate the most fundamental aspects of the PRC’s formal legal 
corporate governance system, and to institute robust board-related and/or minority 
shareholder-empowering norms designed to protect against controlling shareholder 
oppression or malfeasance. The CSRC has historically made these incursions via two 
distinct methods: (1) the filling-in of substantive corporate law doctrines that still have 
to be enforced by a state actor, whether the judiciary or a regulator (e.g., corporate fidu-
ciary duties); and (2) the establishment of “self-enforcing” mechanisms designed to be 
effective as between the parties to a firm before the state or any external actor needs to be 
involved in enforcement, if at all (e.g., minority shareholder “class” negative veto rights). 
These interventions include, inter alia:
• Corporate fiduciary duties for orthodox fiduciaries and even controlling share-
holders, in both the operational and takeover contexts;
• Supermajority approval/negative veto mechanisms empowering so-called “pub-
lic” shareholders;
• Supermajority approval (and/or controlling shareholder recusal) and superma-
jority director approval (and/or director recusal) for controlling shareholder 
related-party transactions and self-dealing;
• Independent directors; and
• Broad shareholder “class” negative veto rights (even when shareholder classes 
were prohibited).2
I should emphasize that the self-enforcing genus of regulatory intervention, which can be 
effective without recourse to enforcement by any external institution, is far more likely to 
be effective given the structure of China’s political economy. For example, if there is con-
cern about the political and economic power of the Party-state’s controlling shareholders, 
 2 Id. at 677–84. 
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or doubts about the competence, autonomy, and independence of the Chinese judiciary, 
the implantation of substantive corporate fiduciary duties into China’s company law is 
not likely to have much effect, because articulation and enforcement of these norms may 
be frustrated by the phenomena animating the reform in the first place. Conversely, a 
self-enforcing mechanism such as the negative veto rights conferred on non-controlling 
shareholders for approval of related-party “external” guarantees forced out of listed com-
panies constitutes a very effective constraint for the identified abuse, especially when 
compared to reliance on any doctrinal fill-in such as a vague and unevenly applied duty 
of loyalty standard applied ex post. Indeed, the real effectiveness of such self-enforcing 
mechanisms was seen in the run-up to the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) bid for Unocal (where the independent directors blocked a Unocal-invited 
bid), and in the bid by Singapore Airlines for a controlling stake in China Eastern 
Airlines (vetoed by a class vote).3
II. The Consequences of Corporatization without Privatization
Why has the CSRC been obligated to execute this regulatory intervention? The answer 
to that question lies in the PRC’s two decades-old “corporatization without privatiza-
tion” program and resultant state capitalism, the commitment in Chinese corporate law 
to what is called “shareholder primacy,” and the development of China’s broader politi-
cal economy.
“Corporatization” as commenced in the 1980s sought to implement a “modern enter-
prise system,” by abolishing the traditional SOE as an organizational form4 and convert-
ing SOEs into a legal form of “company” authorized and governed by PRC company 
law. These organizational forums include: (1) a company limited by shares (CLS), a joint 
stock company form for widely held firms; (2) a limited liability company (LLC), for a 
smaller and closely knit group of investors; or (3) a wholly state-owned sub-form of the 
LLC, a company owned by a state agency with no shareholders’ meeting and an optional 
board of directors. The modern enterprise system would thus create and empower a new 
class of property rights owners in the PRC, namely equity shareholders.
Critically, that process of corporatization did not implicate “privatization” of the 
Chinese economy generally or SOEs individually, or any real withdrawal from the econ-
omy of the state or the Communist Party. This is because a controlling equity interest in 
the SOE or state-owned asset groups converted into a company was maintained by state 
 3 See Nicholas C.  Howson, China’s Acquisitions Abroad—Global Ambitions, Domestic Effects, 48 Law 
Quadrangle Notes 73, 78, 83–84 (2006) (regarding the CNOOC directors’ vote initially blocking 
the proposed CNOOC bid); Barry Naughton, SASAC and Rising Corporate Power in China, 24 China 
Leadership Monitor 1 (2007) (regarding the veto rendered by China Eastern Airlines’ “H” shareholders).
 4 The SOE was not given a legal form until 1988, which saw the promulgation of a “law” governing 
SOEs—concurrent, ironically, with the elimination of the SOE as an organizational form.
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entities, and party committees remained important actors behind the formal governance 
structures required by the corporate form.5 To the present day, the Party-state remains abso-
lutely committed to retaining control over converted asset groups and enterprises in a very 
broad range of sectors—not just the usual suspects for state control (e.g., defense, natural 
resources, key infrastructure) but also non-national security and non-key infrastructure sec-
tors that promise high returns to central or local state or party insiders when financed with 
the aid of passive public investors.
Moreover, it appears that the corporatization without privatization program was 
motivated by desires very similar to those which animated late nineteenth-century Qing 
dynasty attempts to engage in “state (court) capitalism” via establishment of guandu shang-
ban (“government promoted/supervised, merchant operated”) and later guanshang heban 
(“government-merchant co-operated”) entities such as the China Merchant Steamships 
Company (lunchuan zhaoshangju), the Kaiping Mining Company, the Shanghai Cotton 
Cloth Mill, and the Jiangnan Arsenal ( jiangnan jiqi zhizao zongju)—all attempts to reor-
der state-owned asset groupings into a new, “modern,” and “Western” form that could 
attract passive capital investment from the domestic and global capital markets, without 
ceding any real governance power over the subject businesses.6 At least in this regard, the 
PRC has been fabulously successful, as corporatized SOEs perceived as the mainstays of 
China’s state capitalism model—still absolutely controlled by the Party-state or state hold-
ing companies—bring off some of the largest IPOs in history and are included among the 
world’s largest firms by market capitalization.7
This design for corporatization without privatization, coupled with the maintenance of 
central or local state (and ultimately Communist Party) control, has affected both closely 
held LLC firms and widely held CLSs, with a pronounced effect on the ownership, con-
trol, and governance structures applicable to the PRC’s listed companies and the disem-
powerment of those companies’ public minority shareholders. First, the strong prevalence 
of concentrated ownership in Chinese companies, especially among listed firms, means 
that the key agency problem for PRC corporate governance is not vertical (between man-
agement insiders and a large body of disaggregated shareholders) but horizontal (between 
 5 See Nicholas C.  Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial Banks: Nomenklatura Accountability Serving 
Corporate Governance Reform?, in China’s Emerging Financial Markets:  Challenges and 
Global Impact 123 (Zhu Min et al. eds., 2009) (detailing how party committees operate behind and exer-
cise control over boards of directors at the PRC’s largest international issuers).
 6 See generally Wellington K.K. Chan, Merchants, Mandarins and Modern Enterprise in 
Late Ch’ing China (1977); C.K. Lai, The Qing State and Merchant Enterprise:  The China Merchant’s 
Company, 1872–1902, in To Achieve Security and Wealth: The Qing Imperial State and the 
Economy, 1644–1911 139 (J.K. Leonard & J.R. Watts eds., 1991).
 7 For example, China National Petroleum (no.  4 on Fortune’s 2014 Global 500), the State Grid (no.  7), 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (no. 25), China Construction Bank (no. 38), the Agricultural 
Bank of China (no.  47), China State Construction Engineering (no.  52), China Mobile (no.  55), etc. See 
Fortune’s 2014 Global 500 (Jan. 13, 2015), http://fortune.com/global500/.
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controlling shareholders and minority shareholders).8 Second, the controlling shareholder 
and its insider appointees are not run-of-the-mill control parties/insiders, but instead are 
very often an identity of state or party organizations, representatives of central or local gov-
ernment institutions, or party nomenklatura appointments, giving them a heady mix of 
political and economic power, especially against disaggregated, non-politically privileged 
minority shareholders. Third, the combination of a strong horizontal agency problem, and 
the nature of the control parties, means that China’s listed companies have been run as vehi-
cles to attract passive investment from information-deprived public investors entirely in the 
interest of those largely unaccountable Party-state controlling shareholders. The same firms 
have therefore represented a ready invitation to opportunism, tunneling, minority share-
holder exploitation and oppression, and outright fraud by the controlling shareholders and 
their appointed insiders—an invitation taken up with particular gusto at Chinese CLSs 
with a public float, subject to little monitoring by, or accountability to, passive, politically 
disempowered shareholders or thoroughly compromised judicial enforcement institutions.9 
Fourth, as addressed more than a decade ago by Donald Clarke,10 this process of corpora-
tization without privatization has led to a fundamental dilemma in the design and imple-
mentation of Chinese corporate governance and the legal structure supporting it: the state 
continues to operate enterprises in China and exercise control in furtherance of its goals, 
which, good or bad,11 must be understood as distinct from the presumed narrower share-
holder wealth maximization goal of other (minority) shareholders. Admittedly, the goals 
of the state control party and the minority shareholders may converge from time to time, in 
particular with respect to short-term shareholder gains. There is nothing in the corporatiza-
tion program, however, or in the law, which requires the state control party to exercise its 
control in the service of wealth maximization for all shareholders in the firm. Thus, the state 
through its controlling shareholders in corporatized entities openly exercises an undiluted 
form of what (U.S.) Delaware jurisprudence has called the “right to selfish ownership,” and 
 8 The same problem has operated across the Taiwan Straits, in the Republic of China/Taiwan, and contin-
ues to elicit similar substantive law and institutional changes. See Christopher J. Guinello, The Revision of 
Taiwan’s Company Law: The Struggle toward a Shareholder-Oriented Model in One Corner of East Asia, 28 
Del. J. Corp. L. 75 (2003).
 9 See Y. Cheung, L. Jing, T. Lu, R. Rau & A. Stouraitis, Tunneling and Propping Up: An Analysis of Related 
Party Transactions by Chinese Listed Companies, 17 Pac. Basin Fin. J. 372 (2009); H. Berkman, R. Cole & 
L. Fu, Expropriation through Loan Guarantees to Related Parties, 33 J. Bank. & Fin. 141 (2009); G. Jiang, 
C. Lee & H. Yue, Tunneling through Intercorporate Loans: The China Experience, 98 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (2010); 
Nancy Huyghebaert & Lihong Wang, Expropriation of Minority Investors in Chinese Listed Firms: The Role 
of Internal and External Corporate Governance Mechanisms, 20 Corp. Gov. Int’l Rev. 308 (2012).
 10 See Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 China Econ. Rev. 494, 494–95 
(2003).
 11 The “goals” for which the state exercises its control rights can range from the assumed private interests of 
officials and cadres asked to represent “all of the people” or the state (much discussed in public governance 
literature) to various wider political or social imperatives (e.g., cross-subsidization of failing firms, full 
employment) that seem more benign, but still potentially operate to the detriment of external minority 
investors in a specific firm.
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exploits the minority shareholders, who have no other way to benefit from their in vestment 
in the corporatized firm. As long as Chinese ideology and national industrial policy con-
tinue to sanction state shareholders controlling corporate entities where there are other 
shareholders, real protections for such other shareholders present either (1) a constraint on 
the state’s ability to operate in a way that is the very reason the state has maintained control, 
or (2) a need for separate corporate law regimes for state-controlled corporatized firms, and 
nonstate controlled firms. There is no immediate prospect of a formal, separate legal regime 
for state-controlled firms. Indeed, the 1994 PRC Company Law, the 2006 PRC Company 
Law, and the “modern enterprise system” and corporatization policies were all proclaimed 
as major steps in the opposite direction—elimination of any distinction between state firms 
and nonstate controlled companies. Instead, the history of non-implementation/adjudica-
tion of China’s company law with respect to public capital markets-financed and corpora-
tized SOE issuers12 indicates resistance to the idea of any constraint on, or accountability for, 
the Party-state’s ability to operate subsidiary firms in the way it desires.13
III. Shareholder Primacy and Enabling Corporate Law in China: Enabling 
Exploitation of Minority Shareholders by the Party-State
Since 1994, China’s corporate law has expressed fealty to a robust version of what schol-
ars call a “shareholder primacy” model. Moreover, for the last decade China’s company 
law has been made increasingly “enabling” as epitomized by the wholesale changes 
seen in the 2006 Company Law. Continued shareholder primacy and the increasingly 
enabling orientation of the corporate law and governance system, when coupled with 
the corporatization without privatization program, has resulted in something widely 
acknowledged as pernicious in China and abroad: the open and continued exploitation 
of minority shareholders in Chinese firms. This is the phenomenon that has made necessary 
the CSRC-imposed mandatory provisions discussed here.
 12 See, e.g., Nicholas Calcina Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai Courts, 1992–2008: Judicial Autonomy 
in a Contemporary Authoritarian State, 5 Penn. E. Asia L. Rev. 303, 400–16 (2010); Donald C. Clarke 
& Nicholas Calcina Howson, Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection—Derivative Actions in the 
People’s Republic of China, in The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional 
pproach 243, 254–56, 267–69, 275–78 (Daniel Puchniak et al. eds., 2012) (noting the complete absence of 
widely held or listed company governance-related shareholder company law-related suits (other than securi-
ties law claims alleging fraudulent or misleading disclosure pursuant to a very limited allowance made under 
pressure by the PRC Supreme People’s Court) in the Chinese courts, and the partially related hostility of 
the People’s Courts to any cases involving a large number of parties, resulting in large parts of the PRC 
Company Law being left unimplemented).
 13 This is a nice example of the dilemma political scientist Mary Gallagher terms “authoritarian legality.” See 
Mary Gallagher, Authoritarian Legality:  Law, Workers, and the State (forthcoming 
2016) (“ … institutionalization brings the allure of constraints and rules on others while continued state-led 
control over deployment of these institutions provides opportunity for discretion and flexibility … This is 
one of the privileges (and dilemmas) of single-party regimes. It makes the rules; it doesn’t necessarily bind 
itself to those rules.”).
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“Shareholder primacy” refers to a model of corporate law and governance that bestows 
si gnificant formal governance power on firm shareholders, as the firm’s ultimate owners, 
rather than the agents of those owners, the firm’s directors and officers. In theory, share-
holder primacy can appear justified because shareholders are the owners or stakeholders in 
the firm residual. Moreover, in a corporate ecology characterized by widely held firms and 
extensive separation of ownership and management, where there is concern about those 
agents acting in their own interest and not that of all the owners, any mechanism that 
can rein in those agents and make them accountable to the firm’s owners seems advisable. 
Indicia of shareholder primacy include the power to elect members of the firm’s centralized 
management body (the board of directors), to oust incumbent directors midstream with 
or without cause, and to vote on significant firm decisions. From this perspective, China’s 
modern corporate law system represents a strong version of the shareholder primacy model, 
requiring for example that the general shareholders’ meeting approve dividend distributions.
“Enabling” corporate laws are general corporation codes that provide something like a 
standard form contract structured around default provisions, with very few mandatory 
or immutable rules governing firm participants’ internal rights and obligations or the 
firm’s external activities. In most developed capitalist jurisdictions, corporate governance 
at specific firms is now determined by a mixed application of some default provisions left 
unchanged by the participants, specific arrangements crafted ex ante by the contracting 
out of other default rules, and extremely broad common law doctrines interpreted and 
enforced ex post by the judiciary when prodded by private shareholder plaintiffs (and, in 
the United States, their attorneys, working with the benefit of contingency fee arrange-
ments and liberal cost-sharing/class action rules). Basic theories of the corporation have 
developed in parallel, from the eighteenth and nineteenth century idea that firms were 
a creation of the state pursuant to a specific legislative act, to the twentieth-century con-
tractarian conception of the company as a creation of private contract. For many ana-
lysts, it is the non-mandatory, enabling character of corporate law that both defines and 
recommends it. Indeed, in the Anglo-American capitalist economies there is a bedrock 
confidence that private capital accumulates and will be efficiently allocated to useful 
projects through an infinite variety of complex and individualized arrangements regard-
ing entity governance and investor rights, which arrangements are in turn determined 
by different levels of information availability, the value brought to the table by specific 
investors, and many other factors. Said another way, there is a strong belief in many of 
the developed capitalist economies that any attempt to significantly pattern or constrain 
those arrangements beyond what the public interest or basic accountability absolutely 
requires will impede realization of optimal privately negotiated arrangements and thus 
fatally dampen capital formation.14
 14 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 Va. L. Rev. 685, 688 
(2009) (“Corporate law came to be enabling rather than directory in the United States because that serves 
investors’ interests, not because it serves managers’ interest. States that adopt inefficient regulation propel 
capital out of their jurisdictions.”)
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In 1993–1994, the Chinese Communist Party-led government began its experiment with 
company lawmaking decidedly in the “mandatory” and not the “enabling” mode.15 Indeed, 
that orientation was but a continuation of China’s earliest conception of corporate law16 and 
general approach to law (as “rule by law”).17 This in turn is consistent with the desire of the 
Chinese state (and before that, the Chinese imperial court) to control or closely monitor 
potentially independent capital accumulation and business activity, and benefit from it.18 
At the same time, China’s first post-1949 corporate law held high the banner of shareholder 
primacy, putting significant formal power over directors, officers, or supervisors into the 
hands of shareholders. Without doubt, this was deemed permissible by PRC policymakers 
and legislators, and the promoters of what became state capitalism, because of the distinc-
tive capital structure of corporatized SOEs described above—featuring a large, controlling 
shareholder with ties to the Party-state given full power to dominate the subsidiary firm 
directly as a shareholder or via a board of directors elected entirely by it.
Only with the passage of the 2006 Company Law did the PRC move away from a 
business regulation philosophy and toward an enabling statute—one that allows for 
increased contracting-out of default rules ex ante alongside continuing self-enforcing 
mechanisms, and that creates significant work for the judiciary applying standards ex 
post. This development in the direction of a formally enabling corporate law system has 
been celebrated widely in the PRC among academics and People’s Court officials alike. 
For example, a 2007 commentary by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court (regarding a 
2003 case where the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court had to choose between 
statutory rights of first refusal owed to existing shareholders and the rights of a good faith 
purchaser under a fraudulently approved securities purchase contract) appears to chan-
nel U.S.  federal appellate judge and law and economics theorist Frank Easterbrook19 
directly:
First and foremost, the thing we must clarify is this:  the jurisprudential logic  
underlying the giving of priority to the [right of first refusal] over the purchase rights 
 15 See Clarke, supra note 10, at 496, 500 (“ … and the [1994] Company Law is thus clearly more concerned with 
regulating and suppressing than with fostering and nurturing.” … “The policy choice in the current [1994] 
Company Law is clear; the rules are almost uniformly mandatory.”)
 16 See William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century 
China, 54 J. Asian Stud. 43 (1995).
 17 See Liang Zhiping, Explicating “Law”: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture, 3 
Colum. J. Chinese L. 55, 61, 89 (1989).
 18 See Chan, supra note 6; Kirby, supra note 16, at 44 (“The history of this first modern Chinese [company] law 
is to some degree a barometer of the state’s assumptions towards the economy over the course of the twenti-
eth century … [T] he Chinese state would be the prime beneficiary of the adoption of the corporate form of 
business activity. But the first assumption of the [early-twentieth-century] Qing reformers, that the modern 
corporation on a Western model would be the essential vehicle for private Chinese economic development, 
would prove quite mistaken.”); Madeleine Zelin, The Firm in Early Modern China, 71 J. Econ. Behav. & 
Org. 623 (2009).
 19 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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of the transferee is absolutely not because the former right is in statute and the latter 
is merely a contractual right. This is because statutory rights are not always superior 
to contractual rights—in fact, it is just the opposite. Approaching it systematically 
and adhering to the orientation which protects private ordering, regulation of the mar-
ket requires that application of the law fully respect the freedom to contract to encour-
age successful transactions … There is significant meaning in this.20
Yet notwithstanding this rhetorical fealty to enabling corporate law, the manda-
tory norms imposed by the CSRC and other agencies discussed in this chapter (and 
the absorption of many of those regulatory mandates into the 2006 PRC Company 
Law)21 have pushed the applied law of corporate governance in precisely the opposite 
direction.22
IV. Regulatory Intervention: Structural Exploitation, Legislative 
Competence, and the Judiciary
The pernicious implications of the corporatization without privatization program, cou-
pled with an ever-more enabling and thus controlling shareholder-empowering corpo-
rate law, make the reasons for the CSRC’s counter-strike obvious. Given lopsided capital 
structures and thoroughly dominated directorates and shareholders’ meetings, not to 
mention the unconstrained political and economic power of state controlling sharehold-
ers (and their appointed insiders) and a radical information asymmetry between such 
controlling shareholders and diffuse public investors, an enabling company law design 
built on strong notions of shareholder primacy has been a broad invitation for domi-
nant shareholders to oppress and exploit far weaker actors in the firm, especially where 
minority shareholders have very little power to bargain for information or effective 
 20 Commentary regarding the case reported as “A. Investment Company v. Wang and Other Shareholders” 
(Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court, on appeal 2003), in 2005 年上海法院案例精选 (2005 
Selection of Shanghai Court Cases) 106–09 (Shanghai Higher People’s Court ed. 2007); with the 
quoted portion of the commentary id. at 111 (emphasis added).
 21 See, e.g., 2006 PRC Company Law, art. 20 (fiduciary duties for controlling shareholders and an oppres-
sion remedy), art. 106 (cumulative voting, formally enabling but made mandatory by CSRC regulation 
and approval practice), art. 16  & 122 (cap on external guarantees, recusal of controlling shareholders on 
shareholder votes for such guarantees, and a supermajority vote for any such guaranty greater in value than 
30 percent of corporate assets, or a majority of non-control shareholders; supermajority shareholder vote 
on disposition of significant assets), art. 123 (independent directors), art. 125 (recusal of conflicted direc-
tors), art.127 (allowance for different classes of shares and preferred shares), and art. 148 (fiduciary duties for 
orthodox corporate fiduciaries).
 22 Interestingly, my own research has shown how the Chinese People’s Courts—contrary to some expectations 
and certainly the doctrinal rhetoric quoted from the A. Investment Company v. Wang case commentary 
above—have mimicked this trajectory, adjudicating some enabling provisions of the 1994 and 2006 PRC 
Company Laws as mandatory. See Howson, supra note 12, at 382–83.
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protections, or obtain any price discount23 to compensate for their disadvantageous 
position. Therefore, mandatory provisions—from whatever source—designed to protect 
the basic informational and governance rights of minority capital providers against such 
control parties were required.
Observers might respond that the remedy to this baked-in exploitation of minority 
property rights-holders should have been available from either the legislator or the court 
system. Certainly there was an effort in 2005 to create effective legal remedies for minor-
ity shareholders against politically powerful insiders and controlling shareholders via 
wholesale reformation of the defective 1994 PRC Company Law. This reform concret-
ized CSRC regulatory mandates,24 and added both substantive claims (e.g., duty of care, 
controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duties, piercing of the corporate veil) and procedural 
innovations (e.g., a derivative action, the ability of shareholders to call special sharehold-
ers’ meetings). However, China’s developing legal system and the institutional status quo 
ante made clear that substantive legal change would not be enough, because of at least 
three additional factors. First, there have been and remain serious issues pertaining to 
the technical competence of legislators at the National People’s Congress, especially with 
respect to complex fields such as corporate law and securities regulation. Moreover, it is 
apparent that China’s national lawmaking institutions lack objectivity, at least insofar 
as their legislative product conflicts with the interests of the Party-state’s SOE systems.25 
Second, although the situation is better than some observers surmise, there must be con-
tinuing doubts about the competence, autonomy, and political independence of judi-
cial institutions called upon to implement corporate law standards or remedies.26 Even 
if state-of-the-art substantive provisions and procedural mechanisms are introduced into 
 23 This has been demonstrated empirically by the long-standing A share price premium over H shares for the 
same issuer listing A shares on the PRC exchanges and H shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and 
has been tracked by the Hang Seng “China AH Premium Index” since January 2006. See Hang Seng 
China AH Premium Index (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.hsi.com.hk/HSI-Net/static/revamp/contents/
en/dl_centre/factsheets/FS_AHPe.pdf. This A share premium has been thought to result from the limited 
supply of, and strong demand for, A share issues for domestic PRC purchasers who have not been permit-
ted to invest in “overseas” (including Hong Kong) markets. No one has seriously asserted that the A share 
premium over H shares results from stronger investor protections or better corporate governance associ-
ated with a listing on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Exchanges. In recent years the A share premium over H 
shares has declined because of increased foreign investment in the A share markets via the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor program and greater access by PRC purchasers to overseas listed equities via the 
Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor program, the mutual recognition of mutual funds between the 
PRC and Hong Kong, and the newly unveiled Shanghai-Hong Kong (Exchange) Link.
 24 Supra note 21.
 25 See, e.g., Xi Chao, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China—How Did We Get There?, 5 J. Bus. L. 413, 423–27 
(2011) (describing the role of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) in sabotaging the CSRC’s more permissive statutory veil-piercing standard originally set forth in 
the Company Law Amendment’s Consultation Draft, due to SASAC concern that the more liberal doctrine 
would also be applied to the control groups of unlisted corporatized SOEs).
 26 See, e.g., Howson, supra note 12 (corporate law adjudication in the Shanghai Higher People’s Court system 
between 1992 and 2008); Wang Jun 王军, 公司经营者忠实和勤勉义务诉讼研究– 以 14 省, 直辖市的 
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PRC company law—as they assuredly were with promulgation of the final 2006 Company 
Law—there is a continuing concern as to whether the People’s Courts will be competent 
and powerful enough to utilize, adjudicate, and enforce such law with respect to any kind 
of business enterprise, much less be permitted to accept disputes concerning the same.27 
Third, a basic dilemma in China’s corporate governance revealed in my own research on 
the People’s Courts is the almost complete non-implementation of China’s Company Law 
for the benefit of minority shareholder plaintiffs in corporations financed through public 
capital markets. This phenomenon arises in part from the system’s denial of any constraint 
on the state’s ability to operate such firms as it sees fit, which is the reason it maintained 
control in the first place.
V. The CSRC: A Conflicted Actor
From an institutional standpoint, then, the above-described factors worked together to 
leave the CSRC as one of the only state institutions in China capable of: (1) expert drafting 
of substantive provisions, in particular of the self-enforcing type; (2) technical resistance 
against controlling state shareholders and the political-economic systems backing them; 
and (3) substituting for an inexpert, overly bureaucratic or politically cowed judiciary, at 
least with respect to publicly listed firms.28
137 件判决书为样本 (Analysis of Litigation Regarding Company Management’s Duties of Loyalty and 
Care—Using 137 Judgment Opinions from 14 Provinces and Directly Administered Municipalities), 5 
北方法学 (N. Juris.) 24 (2011) (corporate fiduciary litigation nationwide); Clarke & Howson, supra note 
12 (the corporate derivative action); Hui Huang, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where Is It Now and 
Where Is It Headed?, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 743 (2012) (corporate veil piercing).
 27 I should note in passing that the PRC judicial bureaucracy—that is, not courts issuing opinions on adju-
dicated cases—has played some role in implanting substantive corporate law doctrine and procedural 
innovations into China’s corporate law and governance system. Before 2005, this was done via the cre-
ation by individual (Provincial/Directly-Administered Municipality) Higher Level People’s Court 
systems of “opinions” on issues presented in litigation concerning the woefully deficient 1994 PRC 
Company Law. Notable Higher People’s Court opinions on corporate law came from Jiangsu (2003), 
Shanghai (2003), and Beijing (2004). Importantly, none of these local court system opinions attempted 
to institute self-enforcing governance mechanisms such as supermajority negative veto rights in the 
style the CSRC has for public companies. After the effectiveness of the 2006 PRC Company Law, the 
Supreme People’s Court has released three judicial “regulations” concerning the company statute, and 
has embarked on a Guiding Cases project, none of which, however, remake corporate governance norms 
in the same fashion as the CSRC regulation described here. To date, only one of such Guiding Cases, a 
corporate resolution revocation dispute, has involved corporate governance matters:  “Guiding Case No. 
10,” 李建军诉上海佳动力环保科技有限公司公司决议撤销纠纷案 (Li Jiangjun v. Shanghai Jiapower 
Environmental Protection Science and Technology Co., Ltd.), 最终版本 (Final Version) Nov. 9, 2012 (Jan. 
13, 2015), http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/CGCP-Chinese-Guiding-Case-10.pdf 
(shareholder challenge to a board resolution).
 28 Note that from January 1, 2013, the CSRC asserted expanded jurisdiction beyond domestically or overseas 
exchange-listed companies to include CLSs with more than two hundred shareholders, and CLSs that have 
issued securities “to the general public” or “in a public manner,” an elaboration of regulatory power very 
likely to gain a statutory basis in the revised PRC Securities Law. See Howson, supra note 1, at 713.
 
60      Domestic Institutional Implications
I do not mean to assert in this chapter that the CSRC is entirely, or even mostly, a 
“good actor” under the Chinese Party-state’s model of state capitalism, or that it uni-
formly acts to constrain the power of SOE Party-state controlling shareholder groups. 
Ruoying Chen’s eloquent lament in this volume regarding the low quality human capi-
tal trap created by state capitalism—including specifically the CSRC with respect to 
IPO approvals29 —as well as my own work on illegal and ultra vires enforcement by the 
CSRC against insider trading30 and many other bodies of evidence31 render implausible 
any claim that the CSRC and its human agents are the saviors of the PRC capital mar-
kets, or are immune from agency capture.
Instead, I would note that the CSRC can be a “bad actor” in its day-to-day gatekeeper, 
approval, and enforcement roles, while still being a “good actor” in the sense of supplying 
longer-term, highly sophisticated pre-enforcement or legal constraints on the power of 
state capitalism’s control groups analyzed in this chapter.
VI. How Have the CSRC and Other Agencies Been Permitted to Push Back, 
and What Does It Mean for China’s State Capitalism Model?
I have reviewed some of the reasons why the CSRC and other agencies have inter-
vened to constrain or hold more accountable controlling shareholders with ties to the 
Party-state in the paradigmatic firm operating under state capitalism. A separate why 
question emerges from the dichotomy of action by the CSRC alluded to immediately 
above: Why is a sometimes corrupt, captured agency with increasingly degraded human 
capital creating sophisticated constraints on powerful actors in the economy? In answer-
ing this question there is little doubt about the significance of (1)  input from foreign 
capital market regulators and academics (often delivered via foreign-educated officials 
or academics active inside the PRC), and (2) the competitiveness of highly integrated 
international capital markets requiring sophisticated governance mechanisms in order 
for Chinese issuers to attract capital.
 29 See Ruoying Chen, Chapter 8 in this volume.
 30 See Nicholas Calcina Howson, Enforcement without Foundation?—Insider Trading and China’s 
Administrative Law Crisis, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 955 (2012) (critiquing the CSRC as acting illegally with 
respect to the enforcement of insider trading prohibitions, a critique acknowledged as valid with issu-
ance of a responsive joint explanation by the PRC Supreme People’s Court and the PRC Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate (SPP) drawing such illegal enforcement back within the bounds of legality, at least in crimi-
nal prosecutions by the SPP).
 31 See, e.g., Zhou Tianshu, Is the CSRC Protecting a “Level Playing Field” in China’s Capital Markets: Public 
Enforcement, Fragmented Authoritarianism and Corporatism, (Jan. 13, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2505568. The author is a professor at the China University of Politics 
and Law.
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The far more intriguing question is how the CSRC has been permitted to erect and 
enforce effective constraints on the power of China’s Party-state-tied controlling share-
holders. Although the Party-state is not the monolith many popular accounts portray, 
it does seem startling that there is any allowance for an agency embedded in the same 
Party-state (with no economic and little independent political power) to conceive and 
implement mechanisms that limit the power of, or seek to hold accountable, politically 
far better-endowed actors.
In starting to answer this question, I note at the outset that I do not address the more 
traditional political scientist’s inquiry: the sources of the CSRC’s concrete power. Thus, 
for example, I do not seek to answer the following questions: What rank does the CSRC 
have in the state bureaucracy (and its party organ in the parallel party system)? In which, 
or whose, patronage network does the CSRC lie? What individual or groups of lead-
ers have empowered the CSRC at different times in its development? What resources 
can the CSRC attract, and conversely what resources does it control? Is the CSRC able 
to resist agency capture, and if so how? Although the development of the CSRC as an 
institution of the Party-state is a rich area for continued research, the answers to these 
questions will vary greatly over time, given the varied power (and power bases) of differ-
ent individuals and their allies (e.g., compare recent CSRC Chairmen Zhou Xiaochuan 
(2000–2002), Shang Fulin (2002–2011), Guo Shuqing (2011–2013), and the present 
incumbent Xiao Gang (2013–present)), and the development of the PRC capital markets 
and their engagement with global capital markets. Variance along these dimensions may 
in turn obscure larger structural features that explain what the CSRC is doing. Instead, 
I address the CSRC’s normative power in trying to explain the phenomenon identified 
in this chapter and its relationship with state capitalism as practiced in the PRC.
Although what I describe in this chapter may appear to be a very specific and tech-
nical aspect of the established PRC “fragmented authoritarianism” narrative,32 it is 
different. The traditional fragmented authoritarianism account focuses on how verti-
cal (from center to locality) governmental and bureaucratic systems battle across hori-
zontal lines (within a given geographic area) with respect to governmental policy or 
approvals. This chapter addresses something distinct, and a phenomenon directly 
 32 See Kenneth Lieberthal & Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China:  Leaders, 
Structures and Processes 3–34 (1988); Kenneth Lieberthal, Introduction:  The “Fragmented 
Authoritarianism” Model and Its Limitations, in Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making 
in Post-Mao China 1–32 (Kenneth Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1992); Kenneth Lieberthal, 
Governing China—From Revolution through Reform 186–88 (2004). Political scientist 
Andrew C. Mertha has also written more recently on this aspect of PRC governance. See Andrew C. Mertha, 
“Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”: Political Pluralization of the Chinese Policy Process, 200 The China 
Quarterly 1 (2009); Andrew C. Mertha, Policy Enforcement Markets—How Bureaucratic Redundancy 
Contributes to Effective Intellectual Property Implementation in China, 38 Comp. Pol. 295 (2006). However, 
all of these studies focus on horizontal competition (or, in Professor Mertha’s case, redundancy in enforce-
ment) between vertically arranged governmental and bureaucratic actors, usually with respect to specific 
policy decisions or approvals.
 
62      Domestic Institutional Implications
tied to the rise of state capitalism:  a horizontal contest between a central govern-
ment agency creating pre-enforcement mechanisms and ex post–applied doctrines 
that systemically constrain the economic and directorial power of a supremely pow-
erful, nongovernmental, non-regulatory constituency—SOE groups and the con-
trolling shareholders they produce. This kind of fragmentation of the Party-state is 
the inevitable result of the state capitalism model, where units endowed with both 
political and economic power are ranged against other units with governmental/
administrative power alone.
My tentative answers to the how question focus on the CSRC’s normative power 
against corporatized SOEs, their control groups, and the systems that support them, 
and the extent to which the expression of that normative power is necessary for the 
flourishing of state capitalism in contemporary China. In the following section, 
I consider the issue from four different perspectives: (1) What it is about the CSRC, 
as a new kind of government unit in China, that empowers it to act in this fashion?; 
(2) What might cause powerful controlling shareholder groups to allow the CSRC 
this provocative space for maneuver?; (3) Why might the human agents appointed by 
the Party-state to run corporatized SOEs welcome such constraints?; and (4) Why 
might the state capitalism model require both the expression and enforcement of the 
constraints identified here to finance itself in a sustained manner?
A. The CSRC as a New Kind of PRC Party-State Agency
The CSRC was the first agency and subsequently ministry-level body in the PRC’s 
history with jurisdiction over an area that is not a specific industrial sector, but a 
market activity in an increasingly market-oriented economy. Thus, just as the 
Ministry of Textile Industry, for example, once governed the PRC’s entire textile 
industry and its productive SOEs, the CSRC can be seen—and more important, 
sees itself—as China’s “Ministry of Capital Markets,” a regulator certainly, but also 
a government department charged with maintaining the operation, integrity, and 
attractiveness of China’s domestic capital markets. This sense of ownership of the 
capital markets, and bureaucratic investment in the success of the market it governs, 
contributes to the CSRC’s concrete moves to resist the power of even politically 
well-endowed SOEs and their supporting systems. In addition, and notwithstand-
ing the strengthening of its regional offices, the CSRC is very much an organ of the 
central government, and therefore an organ of the Party-state that is not tied to or 
reliant upon a given industrial or manufacturing sector, or any particular geographic 
region. Although most large SOE systems have their origin in some kind of central 
authority (usually a former ministry metamorphosed into a group holding com-
pany), their robust political and economic interest eventually narrows to a specific 
sector (e.g., telecoms, power generation, downstream oil and gas and petrochemi-
cals), a part of that specific sector (as a member of a duopoly or tri-opoly), and then 
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often into a region.33 Consider how the three giant SOEs in the oil industry—CNOOC, 
the China National Petroleum Corporation/PetroChina, and Sinopec—have their ori-
gins at the national level, but have since each been directed into specific sectors (upstream 
(onshore and offshore) versus downstream and petrochemicals) and specific geographical 
areas in China. The same might be observed for the corporatized offspring of the former 
PRC Ministry of Post and Telecommunications—China Telecom, China Mobile, and 
China Unicom. Thus, although observers may understand the corporatized SOE systems 
of China’s state capitalism as all-powerful, and rooted in the center, the breadth of their 
power is actually narrower than that of a purely central organ encompassing all industrial 
and service sectors such as the CSRC.
B. Part y-State Controlling Shar eholders
From the standpoint of the Party-state’s political-economic behemoths, corporatized 
SOE systems and their control groups, the CSRC pushback described in this chapter may 
be perceived as harmlessly expressive, understood ex ante by such powerful forces to be 
without effect or risk of real enforcement, or to take an idiom from nineteenth-century 
Brazil, “para inglês ver” (“for English eyes”).34 This view might explain the long-standing 
allowance for the CSRC’s mandatory constraint mechanisms, especially if they are 
understood as intended merely to be expressive for foreign investors and the domes-
tic capital markets audience, or are symbolically enforced to provide comfort to pub-
lic investors, in each case given the open exploitation of minority shareholders under 
the corporatization without privatization program. If this is true, the control groups 
that occupy the heights of China’s state capitalism might be quite content to allow such 
mechanisms, secure in the knowledge that they will not generally be enforced or provide 
any real obstacles to the groups’ power and discretion with respect to dominated subsid-
iaries. In my view this explanation does not possess real force, however, precisely because 
many of the CSRC-initiated mechanisms have nothing to do with overseas listing issu-
ers and work purely with respect to domestically listed issuers. Moreover, although the 
“for English eyes” answer might fit some of the doctrinal gap-filling that the CSRC has 
pursued over the years—for example, fiduciary duties for, and anti-oppression remedies 
against, controlling shareholders that are never subject to adjudication because they 
involve large plaintiff groups—it does not account for the self-enforcing genus of con-
straints such as supermajority shareholder or board votes after recusal of related parties, 
 33 See generally Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J.  Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions:  Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 697, 704–33 (2013).
 34 Under pressure from the anti-slave trade British Parliament, in 1831 Brazil promulgated a law declaring free 
all slaves trafficked to Brazilian ports. As was intended, the law went largely unenforced, as slaves continued 
to arrive at Brazilian ports and be sold, and so the law was “for English eyes” or “for appearances only,” 
known ahead of time as a norm for external consumption that would not be enforced.
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which are respected and implemented at China’s largest firms, and where there is ample 
evidence of concrete application of the mandatory constraints described in this chap-
ter. And, of course, there is no guarantee that even some of the non-self-enforcing con-
straints introduced into the governance mix for China’s state capitalism powers might 
not increasingly gain traction over time. A perhaps more nuanced version of this view is 
that these mechanisms—the self-enforcing type in particular—are understood imme-
diately by the SOE control groups as being more than merely expressive, and known to 
be subject to implementation in fact, but that the prospect of implementation spurred 
by private claimants is nonetheless largely discounted by the most powerful controlling 
shareholders because of familiar collective action, information deficit, and passivity 
problems for the great mass of public minority shareholders.
C. Part y Nomenklatur a Appointees  
to State-Controlled Fir ms
It is now well established that many of the human agents of Party-state control at the 
largest corporatized SOEs are officials embedded in the Chinese Communist Party’s 
personnel appointments or nomenklatura system who seek advancement in reform-era 
China through both governmental and enterprise appointments, and rotate easily 
through both spheres. Thus, the nominal CEOs (but more importantly ranking party 
officials) at direct competitors China Mobile and China Unicom may switch jobs, 
the CEO of Sinopec may leave that corporate position to take up the post of governor 
of a major coastal province, or the head of one of the major state-owned commercial 
banks may become the Governor of the PRC’s central bank, Chairman of the CSRC, 
or governor of a provincial People’s Government. When such appointment rotations 
result in members of the nomenklatura being charged with direction of a large corpo-
ratized SOE that is a key instrument of the PRC’s state capitalism, it may be critical for 
that individual’s further advancement that the SOE assets or the firm the individual 
is tasked with operating are successful in business terms, but also that the individual 
does not attract public opprobrium, shareholder dissension, or negative press attention, 
domestically or abroad.35 It is therefore not absurd to think that these individuals might 
counterintuitively welcome constraints on their power (and, indirectly, on the power 
of the Party-state, which brought them to the firm) to protect themselves against hav-
ing to direct, for example, inefficient or unprofitable related-party transactions, or at 
least allow them the safety of prior supermajority, interested party-recused approvals.36 
Flat constraints may allow them to avoid risky, possibly pressurized decisions entirely; 
 35 See Howson, supra note 5.
 36 I am grateful to my former University of Michigan colleague Professor Zhao Minyuan for this insight.
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adherence to mandatory procedures for supermajority approvals and the like may pro-
vide for some measure of ex post protection for transactions that go sour.
D. The Financing of State Capitalism
Finally, and perhaps most important, the governance constraints visited on the con-
trol parties of China’s state capitalism addressed in this chapter may be welcomed or at 
least tolerated by corporatized SOE systems and the controlling shareholders they have 
spawned as the small price of continued access to financing in the domestic and global 
capital markets. Put differently, formal constraints on controlling shareholder gover-
nance power within a listed firm may be the price that has to be paid for the appearance 
of functioning capital markets capable of attracting capital, something even the heights 
of China’s state capitalist establishment desperately needs. It is difficult to prove this 
point to the satisfaction of law and finance scholars, as it is exceedingly unlikely that 
the CSRC-origin mandatory constraints presently imposed on state controlling share-
holder power will be removed or weakened,37 and thus there is no possibility of an event 
study tracking the pricing of PRC-listed issuers before and after such change. We do 
know, however, that many of the CSRC-implemented mandatory rules—such as the 
paradigmatic December 2004 “Regulations Regarding Strengthening Protection of the 
Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders,” which defined public equity sharehold-
ers other than controlling shareholders as a kind of class and conferred upon that class 
negative veto rights regarding a broad range of important decisions38 —were issued by 
the CSRC in direct response to complaints from domestic investors and the increasingly 
autonomous PRC financial press. This was also the dynamic at work in India more than 
a decade ago, where in 2001 the Indian securities regulator implemented similar reforms 
originating in a voluntary corporate governance code promulgated by an organization 
made up of, and representing the interests of, India’s largest public firms.39 Finally, this 
proposed rationale for acceptance of significant constraints on state controlling share-
holders aligns perfectly with what I assert is the original policy rationale for the corpo-
ratization without privatization process itself—the reordering of SOE asset groupings 
 37 Just the opposite in fact—the author has reviewed a draft of the revised PRC Securities Law distrib-
uted inside China (at the time of this writing, in January 2015), and its provisions incorporate all of the 
CSRC-origin mandatory rules described here, and provide for new and more robust constraints and manda-
tory disclosures.
 38 See Howson, supra note 1, at 680–81.
 39 See Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya Khanna, Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firm Value? 
Event Study Evidence from India, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 749, 759 (2007) (“Corporate governance 
reform efforts in India were largely triggered by [the Confederation of Indian Industry’s] promulgation of 
its Corporate Governance Code in 1998. CII then followed up by lobbying SEBI to implement mandatory 
reforms—presumably consistent with the CII Code … Much like the Business Roundtable in the United 
States, major Indian firms were the interest group most likely to oppose governance reform. Instead, how-
ever, CII initiated the reform effort.”).
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into a new legal form able to attract passive capital investment from the domestic and 
global capital markets.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have reviewed two distinct, and often opposing, projects of the PRC 
Party-state with respect to corporatized SOE groups, the undisputed engines of China’s 
domestic and global economic activity under state capitalism. On the one hand, we 
can understand the Chinese Party-state as a multifaceted and overbearing economic 
actor spawning a parade of politically well-endowed controlling shareholders uniquely 
positioned to dominate subsidiary corporations established as passive vehicles to attract 
public capital markets financing, and to operate the firms entirely in their own inter-
est. On the other hand, the same PRC Party-state has also established a securities 
markets regulator with the undisputed power to regulate the internal corporate gover-
nance arrangements for such dominated subsidiary corporations, which regulator has 
conceived sophisticated mechanisms of resistance against the control parties of state 
capitalism.
From a legal systems perspective, this understanding of two opposing prongs of the 
PRC Party-state should help us to comprehend better the CSRC’s serial mandatory-type 
regulatory incursions into the province of enabling legal corporate governance norms. 
With the PRC’s corporatization without privatization in the embrace of a shareholder 
primacy model, we are confronted with a notional and mostly rhetorical retreat from 
the economy of the Party-state “under law” (the enabling Company Law specifically). 
This is a retreat, however, which in fact cloaks the reassertion or maintenance of concen-
trated power by the Party-state metamorphosed into a politically privileged controlling 
shareholder. Moreover, this operates in a context of “authoritarian legality” where the 
control parties can reliably ensure that formally conferred “legal” protections for the 
exploited minority are not utilized (i.e., the absence of listed company corporate gover-
nance cases in the Chinese courts, and obstacles placed in the way of multiparty actions 
of any kind).
The only effective remedy for this structurally determined exploitation of minority 
shareholders, and the inability of the system to enforce whatever legal protections are 
on offer, is state intervention of another sort: the injection by a competing Party-state 
institution of immutable substantive doctrines and mandatory corporate governance 
provisions, with the best kind being self-enforcing mechanisms whereby the Party-state 
rule-maker cannot escape being bound by its own rules. That is precisely the path pur-
sued by the CSRC and other bureaucratic actors over the last several decades.
From the distinct perspective of understanding how the PRC Party-state operates 
in the context of state capitalism, we may query how a bureaucratic agency such as the 
CSRC has been permitted this counter-strike against the focal point of Party-state power. 
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In this regard, we must remind ourselves of a central idea behind the twenty-year-old 
PRC corporatization program, itself a direct echo of China’s nineteenth-century impe-
rial fetish for the corporate form—repackaging SOEs and SOE asset groupings into a 
legal entity that can attract large-scale public investment with only minor disruption of 
incumbent governance arrangements. That major underlying policy driver for the corpo-
ratization program from inception aligns well with one explanation for how the CSRC 
and other bureaucracies have been permitted to impose constraints on the power and 
discretion of dominant state-tied controlling shareholders of China’s listed companies. 
Those constraints imposed by administrative regulation, in theory and as applied, only 
make corporatized SOEs more competitive as they seek financing from domestic and 
global capital markets, and thereby help ensure continued access by the very same vehi-
cles of China’s state capitalism to abundant and relatively passive capital. Said another 
way, these effective governance constraints and accountability mechanisms imposed on 
PRC Party-state controlling shareholders in listed firms may be one of the most critical 
long-term elements enhancing the Party-state’s ability to finance state capitalism on the 
domestic and global capital markets. More than merely protecting the state from itself, 
these mechanisms are necessary for the Chinese Party-state’s continued ability to finance 
its involvement in capital-intensive sectors of the domestic and global economies.

